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1 Introduction
In this paper, we analyze how strategic competition between a green firm and a brown competitor
develops when their products are differentiated along two dimensions: hedonic quality and environ-
mental quality. The former dimension refers to the pure (intrinsic) performance of the good, whereas
the latter dimension has a positional content: buying "green" goods satisfies the consumer’s desire
to be portrayed as a socially worthy citizen. We consider the case in which these quality dimensions
are in conflict with each other so that the higher the hedonic quality of a good, the lower the cor-
responding environmental quality. Finally, we evaluate the impact of a minimum quality standard,
and compare our results with those deriving from a traditional model of vertical differentiation.1
Two main considerations inspire our analysis. First of all, people are increasingly concerned with
environmental issues. This may be driven by personal interests, as caring about the environment
also means caring about their own health and safety (Ostrom, 2000; Heffner et al., 2007; Carlsson
et al., 2010, Deltas et al. 2013). Recent analysis also suggests that, when deciding about buying
green goods, people are particularly sensitive to psychological and social concerns (Bateson et al.
2006). In 2007, the New York Times reported the top five reasons why Toyota Prius owners bought
their hybrid cars. The main reason was that “it shows the world that its owner cares”2, while having
“only a basic understanding of environmental issues or the ecological benefits of HEVs (hybrid electric
vehicles)” as pointed out by Heffner et al. (2007, p. 409). An environmentally friendly product may
contribute to satisfy the desire to stand out as socially worthy (Ostrom, 2000), thereby providing
buyers with some social/psychological benefits beyond the material needs that products traditionally
satisfy.3 On the contrary, when purchasing "brown" products, consumers may incur a social stigma
as they fail to comply with a social/psychological norm of responsible citizens.4 Drawing on this
behavioral frame, one can explain for example why people are more likely to offer money in a public
goods game to protect the environment when the giving is done publicly and thus visible to others
(Milinski et al., 2006). The same argument also explains why home owners tend to overinvest in
solar panels and underinvest in other green home improvements, such as additional insulation and
1 Interestingly, this issue has been recently addressed by the European Commission in the Energy Union Package,
where for the first time, the EU stated that consumers can play a key role in fighting pollution.
2http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/04/business/04hybrid.html?_r=0#addendums
3Notice that this positional content has no direct relationship with the current regulation adopted in a specific
country. Case in point, the automotive emissions standards set by the European Union. Two types of cars can meet
the requirements, while having different emissions levels. From the EU viewpoint, both of them are sufficiently green
and therefore do not incur any restriction to their circulation. However, from the consumers’ viewpoint, the less
pollutant the car, the more significant the contribution to the environment and therefore the better the social image
they obtain.
4 If consumers buy a product which lacks any environmental friendly characteristics, they might be burdened by a
bad conscience since it is expected that people be environmentally aware. (Conrad, 2005).
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window caulking; while the former investment is conspicuous and therefore it provides some social
benefits, the latter is not.5 Green consumption is a byword for good citizenship, likewise brown
purchasing leads to a blameworthy social image. A consumption behavior contributes to define the
social traits of an individual, thus its relative position among peers. Accordingly, the higher the
relative environmental quality of a good, namely its ranking along the quality ladder, the higher
its social value and the corresponding position it confers to the buyer along the social ladder. This
represents the first ingredient of our analysis.
However, if this is the case, then why are brown goods still so popular? First of all, producing
high quality goods does not necessarily imply a trade-off between the hedonic and the environmen-
tal dimensions. In some sectors, such as cosmetics, household and sometimes food, high hedonic
quality standards can be obtained without sacrificing the environmental quality. Typical examples
are given by non-animal tested cosmetics, ultra-concentrated detergents and dolphin-safe tuna. On
the contrary, in other sectors, this trade-off is inevitable as certain brown goods meet consumers’
requirements better than the green alternatives (Carrigan and Attalla, 2001; Gupta and Ogden 2009,
Weatherell et al., 2003). For example, conventional internal combustion engine vehicles, although
dominated by green alternatives in terms of polluting emissions, are still superior in most cases to
electric or hybrid vehicles based on pure performance. Paper produced from trees instead of recycled
paper is often preferred because it is softer to the touch. The reprocessing of recycled plastic can
be more challenging compared with virgin plastic. New generation washing machines have energy
saving cycles labeled "green" or "eco"; they are, however, more time consuming in comparison with
ordinary cycles. As Conrad states: "Although nowadays ecologically relevant behavior is expected
from a consumer, there are still consumers who buy canned beer or bottled juice under a no refund
claim system instead of buying beverages under the deposit-refund system. [...] They buy cars with
a big engine and a bad mileage per liter gasoline instead of a threeliter car. They prefer to use the
airplane instead of the train although of a relatively short travel distance, they purchase conven-
tional bulbs instead of electricity saving bulbs or they prefer energy-inefficient halogen light instead
of neon tubes" (Conrad, 2005, p. 1). Whatever the intrinsic driver to brown consumption, "there is
a trade-off between utility derived from preferred characteristics of a product and the moral behavior
of buying “green”, expected by part of the society.[...] Producers are aware of the conflict of con-
sumers between preferred characteristics and their environmental incompatibility. They know that
customers, getting their preferred characteristics from an environmental friendly product, welcome
that coincidence but if environmental aspects are missing, they might anyhow buy the product"
(Conrad, 2005, p. 2). An immediate by-product of this discussion is that, when the aforementioned
5Since Veblen (1899), this behavior has been well described by the theory of conspicuous consumption, in which the
utility (or status) of a consumer depends, at least partially, on the comparison between her own consumption decision
(and the quality of the product she buys) and that of others. Under conspicuous consumption, consumers are willing to
pay a higher price for a functionally equivalent good in order to reveal their wealth, their social status or other specific
characteristics. See Bagwell and Bernheim (1996) and Bowles and Park (2005) for recent contributions.
3
trade-off is evident, the ranking of a good along the quality ladder mainly depends on the importance
that people attach to its environmentally friendly nature as compared to other attributes. The exis-
tence of a conflict between the social component of consumption and the individual-rationality-based
motive constitutes the second ingredient of our analysis.
The modeling framework: a hybrid category of product differentiation
In order to formalize the above ingredients, we define a market consisting of two firms providing
differentiated goods to a population of consumers. The functionality of a product determines its
hedonic quality so that goods can be ranked along a quality ladder based on their performance. The
variant characterized by a better (resp. lower) performance is thus the high (resp. low) quality good
in terms of hedonic quality. Nonetheless, the better is its performance, the more polluting is the
good.
Moreover, we assume that the utility deriving from consuming a product also depends on the
environmental quality gap between this variant and the other available in the market, thereby nesting
the notion of relative preferences in the utility function. From a theoretical perspective, this modeling
choice directly derives from the models of vertical product differentiation with n firms, where n ≥ 2.
In this framework, apart from its own profits, only the payoffs of the adjacent rivals matter for the
strategic behavior of a firm. Consistently with this, its profits are determined by the quality gap
between the quality of its own variant and those of the adjacent ones. Our formulation preserves
this property and it enables us to compare the predictions of our model with those coming from
a traditional vertically differentiated market.6 A further justification for the adoption of relative
preferences lies on the empirical ground. Recent initiatives launched by public authorities provide
comparative information on the main characteristics of products. They aim at explaining the harmful
effects of poor consumption habits on the environment. For example, in the automotive sector, an
increasing number of informative campaigns have been promoted, such as the Italian guidelines on
CO2 emission savings,7 the EPA Smart Way program in the US,8 and the Green Vehicle Guide
promoted by the Australian government.9 A common trait among these campaigns is that they all
compared the environmental performance of vehicles. Relative preferences make the choice between
the two variants far from being evident, and add a further dimension of product heterogeneity
with unexpected effects on the traditional mechanism of competition between firms in a vertically
differentiated market.
6We refer the interested reader to Scarpa (1998) and Gabszewicz et al. (2016) for an in-depth analysis of this
property.
7The Italian guidelines are a joint initiative promoted by the Ministry of Transportation, the
Ministry of Economic Development and the Ministry of Environment. For further details, visit
www.mit.gov.it/mit/site.php?p=cm&o=vd&id=2724.
8Visit www.epa.gov/smartway/basic-info/index.htm for further details. The Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) is a U.S. federal government agency created for the purpose of protecting human health and the environment
by enforcing regulations based on laws passed by Congress.
9Visit http://www.greenvehicleguide.gov.au/GVGPublicUI/home.aspx for further information.
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In case of vertical differentiation, by definition, when two variants are marketed at the same price,
then all consumers prefer the high-quality variant as they all agree on the ranking of products on
the quality ladder. In our setting, competition between firms is described by a model of vertical
differentiation sensu stricto as long as all consumers agree that the hedonic quality of a product
is more valuable than its green nature (or the reverse!). However, if a product is better than the
alternative based on one characteristic but worse than it based on another one, then the defining
property of vertical differentiation may cease to hold. This occurs whenever some consumers give
more value to the hedonic dimension of a variant while others privilege its environmental quality.
In this case, at the same price, some consumers buy a certain good, whereas others prefer the
one produced by the rival. Although this feature evokes a model of horizontal differentiation, its
traditional result that symmetric firms set an equal price at equilibrium can never be observed. The
asymmetry between firms stemming from the two dimensions of product differentiation is such that,
when the defining property of vertical differentiation stops holding, competition falls into a hybrid
category where, at equal prices, both variants have a positive demand (horizontal differentiation) but
at equilibrium their prices do not coincide (vertical differentiation).10
This hybrid category of product differentiation opens the door to several results which are not
observed in a traditional vertically differentiated market. First, we observe that, when both firms are
active at equilibrium, there exist circumstances in which the price of the green good (the low hedonic
quality product) ceases to be lower than the price of the competing variant. We label this scenario
duopoly with price switch. Second, we find that, whenever the intensity of relative preferences is
sufficiently high, only the green firm can remain active, while the "dirty" competitor is pushed off the
market. Thus, a green monopoly is observed. On the contrary, a brown monopoly occurs when the
hedonic quality is by far more significant for consumers than the environmental friendly attribute. It
is worth noting that a monopoly configuration can be observed in a vertically differentiated setting
only under a restrictive assumption on consumer heterogeneity (natural monopoly). Third, at the
green monopoly equilibrium configuration, for extremely high intensity of relative preferences, the
green monopolist extends the market coverage farther than what is typically observed in a vertically
differentiated setting, thereby determining a covered green monopoly.
In the second part of the paper, we develop some policy considerations and analyze the role of a
minimum quality standard in the form of unit emission standards.11 These standards are widespread
in the US. In 2015, President Obama, and EPA’s Administrator Gina McCarthy, defined the final
Clean Power Plan, by which achievable standards were agreed upon. The aim was a 32 percent
10There is a strand of literature considering different sources of product differentiation. For example, Gabszewicz
and Thisse (1986), Neven and Thisse (1990), and Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2012) combine horizontal and vertical
differentiation. Other contributions consider multiple vertical dimensions, such as Vandenbosch and Weinberg (1995)
and Lauga and Ofek (2011).
11Mantovani and Vergari (2013) consider the role of environmental campaign vs. taxation under relative preferences.
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reduction in carbon emissions from 2005 levels to be reached by 2030.12 In Europe, several standards
have been introduced to fight climate change. Case in point, EU legislation defines mandatory emis-
sion reduction targets for new vehicles.13 At world level, in occasion of the Paris Climate Change
Conference held in November 2015, more than 190 countries declared their willingness to cut emis-
sions.14 We consider whether a relevant effect on the environmental damage can be obtained when
the environmental quality standard is between the green variant and the brown one. In this cir-
cumstance only the brown producer undertakes an abatement effort, the green rival being unaffected
by the standard. Also, we assume that the abatement effort improves the environmental quality
of the good at the expense of the corresponding hedonic quality (Boucekkine et al., 2011). Since
complying with stricter environmental norms is costly, when a firm invests in cleaner technology, it
may sacrifice its own economic productivity, at least in a short-run perspective.15 In the literature on
vertical differentiation, typically the introduction of a minimum quality standard in a duopoly setting
reduces product differentiation, thereby increasing price competition (Crampes and Hollander 1995,
Ecchia and Lambertini 1997, Ronnen 1991). A by-product of this finding is that a priori a minimum
quality standard raises the environmental damage (Moraga Gonzales and Padron-Fumero, 2002). In
particular, this undesirable effect is observed when the total output sold at the market equilibrium
increases, due to the price reduction. This also occurs when the polluting firm steals consumers from
the green rival as a consequence of a milder product differentiation. A reduction of emissions coming
from a lower market share of the green firm is countervailed by the increase of emissions deriving
from a larger market share gained by the polluting rival. In our paper, the trade-off between the two
vertical attributes, environmental quality and hedonic quality, are such that this effect is not always
present. In particular, a reduction in damage may be observed under duopoly. This occurs when
the market share stolen by the brown producer is not very significant, due to the high valuation of
consumers for the hedonic attribute. Furthermore, under uncovered green monopoly, the investment
of the brown producer unambiguously reduces the environmental damage.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present the related literature. In Section
3 we set up the baseline model. In Section 4 we develop the equilibrium analysis. In Section 5
we present some environmental policy considerations. Section 6 provides a discussion of our main
assumptions. Section 7 concludes.
12Visit https://www.whitehouse.gov/climate-change for more information.
13Visit http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/vehicles/cars/index_en.htm.
14 It is worth noting that, instead of introducing mandatory emissions limits, the Paris agreement adopted a bottom-up
approach, by which each country can determine its own actions in order to meet the standard. This strategy has been
supported by many climate change experts, especially after the unsatisfying conference in Copenhagen in 2009, which
was based on a top-down approach.
15Admittedly, some argue that there is no way to offset this trade-off regardless of the time horizon (Luken et al.
1996), while others suggest that in the long-run, attaining better technologies in all respects (both environmental and
hedonic dimensions) is feasible (Boucekkine et al., 2011). This statement can be better viewed in a dynamic perspective
where improving the environmental standards entails further cost-reducing or productivity-enhancing innovation (see
for example the analysis by Porter and Linde, 1995).
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2 Related Literature
Throughout the course of the last decade, increasing attention has been devoted to the impact of
environmental awareness on market equilibrium (Conrad, 2005; Eriksson, 2004; García-Gallego and
Georgantzís, 2009; Lombardini-Riipinen 2005; Moraga-Gonzalez and Padron-Fumero, 2002; Nyborg
et al., 2006; Rodriguez-Ibeas, 2007; Ben Elhadj and Tarola, 2015, inter alia).
However, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to combine in a unified setting of vertical
differentiation the notion of relative preferences and the possibility of a conflict between traditional
hedonic qualities and newly established environmental qualities. To this aim, we borrow some ingre-
dients from the paper by Conrad (2005) and nest them in a formal setting inspired by Ben Elhadj and
Tarola (2015). The former work considers the possible conflict between the satisfaction derived from
the preferred characteristics of a product and the moral behavior of buying "green" in a horizontal
differentiation setting. The latter is based instead on a vertically differentiated setting where relative
preferences are explicitly taken into account, as people seek a relative position among peers and buy
products also for their social value. We share with Conrad (2005) the view that this conflict can
modify traditional consumers’ preferences and, accordingly, it must be incorporated directly into the
utility function.16 Nevertheless, we depart from his model as our analysis is conceived in a setting
where goods are defined on the basis of two vertical attributes. Furthermore, far from Conrad (2005),
we assume that both the social benefit and the social stigma attached to buyers increase with the
environmental quality gap between variants. Thus, we combine his view with the notion of rela-
tive preferences adopted by Ben Elhadj and Tarola (2015). This nesting enables us to extend their
analysis. Indeed, they confine their work to the case in which a variant is simultaneously of higher
hedonic quality and more environmentally friendly than the alternative. Accordingly, it never arises
a conflict for the consumer between the pure performance of a product and the social image that can
be associated to its consumption. As a matter of fact, often this conflict does not arise. For example,
Ben Elhadj and Tarola (2015) argue that the social/psychological drivers work unevenly worldwide,
since the sense of responsibility to protect the environment belongs to a set of values arising among
wealthy people after their basic needs have been met. Moreover, as previously reported, there exist
many examples of goods satisfying both high environmental standards without sacrificing their in-
trinsic quality. Still, their analysis misses to formalize the large amount of evidence testifying that
consumers can face a conflict. As such, our paper can be intended as a natural complement of their
work, leading to a new set of results and equilibrium configurations.
Our analysis is finally linked to a significant stream of the behavioral economics literature studying
pro-environmental conduct (for a detailed review, see Turaga et al., 2010). This literature aims
at explaining the discrepancy between the predictions of the economic models based on the homo
economicus assumption and the empirical evidence on the voluntary contribution to public goods.
16 In Section 2 we discuss at length how our utility function differs from that modeled by Conrad (2005).
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Drawing insights from social psychology, the idea is to extend the standard models incorporating
the incentive coming from moral/social motivation. Besides the important works by Andreoni (1988,
1990), there are many recent theoretical as well as empirical contributions in the ecological economics
literature (see among others, Brekke et al., 2003; Nyborg et al., 2006; Manner and Gowdy, 2010;
Owen and Videral, 2006) analyzing the formation of pro-environmental behaviors. While we take
inspiration from this literature, we depart from it as we do not endogenize the moral/social incentive
to pro-environmental conduct. Rather, we study how it affects market competition (and in turn the
environmental damage) in the presence of product differentiation.
3 The Model
Consider a vertically differentiated market with two variants of the same good. Similarly to the
models of vertical differentiation (Mussa and Rosen, 1978), the performance of the variant i, with
i = L,H, determines its intrinsic or hedonic quality qi. Accordingly, qH > qL: variant H has a
higher intrinsic quality than variant L so that qH is ranked higher along the hedonic quality ladder.
Nevertheless, variant qi generates polluting emissions per unit of production at some level ei = φqi.
Accordingly, variant qH represents the brown good. Conversely, variant L is considered as green
because its emissions eL are lower than those deriving from variant qH , namely eL = φqL < eH . The
environmental quality of L is then higher than that of H. The ranking between qH and qL is reversed
when considered in terms of this latter dimension of quality: variant qL is ranked higher than variant
qH along the environmental quality ladder.17 Assuming that either firm can produce only one type of
product, intended as a combination of the two vertical attributes, captures the idea that it is costly
and time-consuming for a firm to go green.18 For example, the switch to solar power requires the
installation of solar panels on business facilities. Moreover, the cost reductions in energy savings are
not always enough to counterbalance the conversion costs, at least in the short run. Therefore, it is
reasonable to assume that the production choice is irreversible: either firm i produces the variant qi,
corresponding to a given hedonic and environmental attributes.19
There is a continuum of consumers indexed by θ and uniformly distributed in the interval [0, b]
with density 1/b. Keeping the traditional interpretation from vertical differentiation models, pa-
rameter θ is proportional to the willingness to pay (henceforth WTP) for intrinsic quality, so that
b denotes the maximal WTP for the performance of a product among consumers.20 Formally, the
17 It is worth noting that, from a social welfare viewpoint, the relative environmental quality of a variant does not
play any role, being rather the absolute level of emissions, eL and eH , the reference point of a social planner.
18We also focus on the case in which firms produce different qualities so as to exclude that price competition leads
to a Bertrand paradox.
19We describe later the cost borne for going green. We relate this cost to cleaner technologies, thereby reinforcing
the idea that the investment for being green is irreversible, at least in the short run.
20Under this assumption on density, the population of consumers is always constant. See Garcia-Gallego and Geor-
gantzis (2009).
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indirect utility of consumer type θ writes as:
U (θ) =


θqH − pH − γ (eH − eL) , if she buys the high quality good,
θqL − pL + γ (eH − eL) , if she buys the low quality good,
0, if she refrains from buying.
We add to the traditional component of the indirect utility function (θqi − pi) a further ingredient,
namely γ (eH − eL) with i = j, such that the satisfaction of buying a product variant can be either
amplified or decreased by the environmental characteristics of variant i as compared with j. It is
worth noting that it is not the level of emissions per se to determine the utility of consuming a
variant. Rather, as both the green and the brown variant are intended as positional goods, it is
the relative pollution emitted by them - captured by the term γ (eH − eL) - to affect consumers’
utility.21 Parameter γ ≥ 0 measures the intensity of the relative dimension of consumption;22 the
higher the value of γ, the stronger the relative (or social) preferences with respect to the hedonic
ones.23 For the sake of simplicity and without any loss of generality, we can assume that φ = 1, so
that (eH − eL) = (qH − qL).24
From the above formulation of the utility function, the consumer that is indifferent between
buying the low quality good and not buying at all is:
θL = γ +
pL − γqH
qL
=
pL − γ(qH − qL)
qL
, (1)
with θL > 0 ⇐⇒ pL > γ(qH −qL). The consumer that is indifferent between buying the low quality
good and the high quality good is:
θH = 2γ +
pH − pL
qH − qL
. (2)
Thus, we immediately write the demand function faced by firm i, xi:
xH =
1
b
(b− θH) =
1
b

b−

2γ +
pH − pL
qH − qL

,
xL =
1
b
(θH −max{θL, 0}) =


1
b

pHqL − qHpL
qL (qH − qL)
+
γ (qH + qL)
qL

if γ <
pL
qH − qL
,
1
b

2γ +
pH − pL
qH − qL

if γ ≥
pL
qH − qL
.
Note that, as soon as θL is not positive, the market is covered, that is also consumer type θ = 0 is
willing to buy.
21See Ben Elhadi et al. (2015) for an in-depth discussion of this formalization. An alternative way to model the utility
function would be relating the satisfaction of an individual when consuming a hedonic quality variant with its absolute
environmental quality. In this latter formulation however, the status or positional content of green consumption would
not be captured. We discuss in Section 5 the main property of the model under this alternative utility function.
22 In our work, we use the terms social and relative interchangeably given that they both indicate that consumption
has a social dimension. Likewise, the resulting satisfaction also depends on the characteristics of society.
23The extreme case γ = 0 reduces the model to the traditional vertical differentiation framework with hedonic
preferences as unique drivers for consumption.
24We could consider a generic φ > 0 without normalizing φ to 1. However, this would not bring any further insight
to the model while making the analysis extremely cumbersome.
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It is easy to see that the defining property of vertical differentiation can cease to hold in this
setting. In particular, when qH and qL are sold at the same price, the demand functions are:
xH |pH=pL =
1
b
(b− 2γ) ,
xL|pH=pL =


1
b

γ (qH + qL)− pL
qL

if γ <
pL
qH − qL
,
2γ
b
if γ ≥
pL
qH − qL
.
Notice that:
xH |pH=pL > 0 ⇐⇒ γ <
b
2
≡ γH ,
xL|pH=pL > 0 ⇐⇒


γ >
pL
qH + qL
≡ γL(pL) if γ <
pL
qH − qL
,
∀ γ > 0 if γ ≥
pL
qH − qL
,
with
pL
qH − qL
> γL(pL). It follows that the market is characterized by vertical differentiation for
extreme values of γ, namely either γ ≤ min{γL(pL), γH} or γ ≥ max{γL(pL), γH}. In the former
case, the environmental awareness is not very significant and no consumer would be willing to buy
the green good if its price was equal to that of the brown alternative. The performance of a product
defining its hedonic quality dominates the environmental impact which describes its environmental
quality and we are in hedonic vertical differentiation. On the contrary, in the latter case, consumers’
involvement in environmental protection is so strong that, even if prices coincide, no one would
buy the brown good, in spite of its better performance. The environmental dimension of quality
dominates the hedonic dimension and we observe environmental vertical differentiation. Finally, for
intermediate values of γ, namely γ ∈
	
min{γL(pL), γ
H},max{γL(pL), γ
H}


, both firms may obtain
a positive market share when they sell at the same price, and horizontal differentiation turns out
to be the proper way to describe the competition between firms. In particular, this happens when
b ≥ bD(pL), with
bD(pL) ≡
2pL
(qH + qL)
. (3)
On the contrary, when b ∈ (0, bD(pL)), in γ ∈ (γH , γL(pL)) neither firm has a positive demand when
they charge the same price.25
We can summarize the above findings in the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 For extreme values of γ, namely either γ ≤ min{γL(pL), γ
H} or γ ≥ max{γL(pL), γ
H},
the defining property of vertical differentiation holds. In the former (resp. the latter) case, the hedonic
quality dimension (resp. the environmental quality dimension) is the main driver of consumption.
25Formally b ≥ bD(pL) ensures that γH > γL (pL).
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We assume that profit functions of firms H and L respectively write as:
πH = xH · pH , (4)
πL = (pL − c)xL, (5)
where c > 0 is the cost per unit of green production. In the above formulation, production costs
for firms only come from producing an environmentally friendly good. Otherwise, one could imagine
that there exists a cost function ci = hi + Ei where hi denotes the hedonic-quality specific cost
borne by firm i, with hH > hL and Ei the environmental quality specific cost, with EH < EL.26
Since it is reasonable that hH > hL always holds, the only way to get cH < cL is to assume that
(EL −EH) > (hH − hL). Without loss of generality, we can write cL > cH = 0.27
In the following analysis we show that different market equilibrium configurations may arise,
depending on the parameters’ values, focusing in particular on the interplay between b and γ. In
order to solve the model, we will compute the price equilibrium candidates corresponding to each
market configuration and provide the parametric intervals for which they yield the corresponding
market outcomes.28 In the text we limit the analysis to the case where the quality gap is such that
qH/qL ∈ (1, 2). In the Appendix, we provide the complementary analysis where qH/qL ≥ 2 and show
there that our qualitative findings are robust to this extension.
4 The equilibrium analysis
Typically, in a vertically differentiated setting, in absence of production costs, there is always room
for two firms if the market is not a natural duopoly.29 Furthermore, when the lowest WTP in the
market is equal to zero, firms never find it profitable to cover the market. Accordingly, the starting
point of our analysis is that both firms are active and the market is uncovered. Therefore, demands
are defined as xL = (θH − θL) /b and xH = (b− θH) /b, and profit functions are given by (4) and (5).
The pair of candidate equilibrium prices can be easily obtained:
p∗L =
2cqH + (qH − qL) (2γqH + bqL)
4qH − qL
, (6)
p∗H =
cqH + (qH − qL) [2bqH − γ(3qH − qL)]
4qH − qL
. (7)
26The case cH > cL has been largely treated in the literature on vertical differentiation. Thus, we can disregard it.
27One may wonder why we do not introduce some fixed costs to capture the role of green technologies in production.
Admittedly, when the quality is mainly related to investments in new technologies or in R&D, the assumption of fixed
quality-specific costs can be reasonable. Nevertheless, a fixed cost does not affect the price game as it does not alter
firms’ best reply functions. In Section 5 we consider alternative cost specifications, such as a marginal cost increasing
with the level of greenness and a fixed cost of greenness, in order to prove the robustness of our results.
28This is standard in models of vertical differentiation. See Wauthy (1996) for more details.
29The upper bound to the number of firms which can coexist at equilibrium with positive market share and positive
equilibrium prices has nothing to do with costs and only depends on pattern of tastes and willingness to pay distribution.
In particular, given a population of consumers, identified by the parameter θ ∈ [α, β], 0 ≤ α < β, the upper bound to
the number of firms is 2 so that the market is a natural duopoly iff α
β
∈

1
4
, 1
2

.
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Formally, for this candidate to be an equilibrium, we need to verify that both prices are positive and
that pL is higher than the marginal cost, namely p∗L > c and p
∗
H > 0:
p∗L ≥ c ⇐⇒ γ ≥
c (2qH − qL)− bqL (qH − qL)
2qH(qH − qL)
≡ γ, (8)
p∗H ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ γ ≤
qH [2b(qH − qL) + c]
(qL − 3qH) (qL − qH)
≡ γ, (9)
with
γ > 0 ⇐⇒ b < b0 ≡
c (2qH − qL)
qL (qH − qL)
, (10)
γ > γ ⇐⇒ b > b ≡
c
(qH + qL)
, (11)
and b0 > b. Moreover, we have to demonstrate that the market is uncovered, and that both goods
have positive demands, i.e. 0 < θL < θH < b. By plugging (6) and (7) into (1) and (2), we obtain:
θ∗H ≤ b ⇐⇒ γ ≤ γ, θ
∗
L ≤ θ
∗
H ⇐⇒ γ ≥ γ,
θ∗L ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ γ ≤ γ ≡ 2cqH + b (qH − qL) qL(2qH − qL) (qH − qL) ,
where the precise values of θ∗L and θ
∗
H are reported in the Appendix (see the Proof of Lemma 1).
Moreover:
γ > γ ⇐⇒ b < b ≡ cqH
(qH − qL)
2 .
One can already notice that there are situations where an interior duopoly solution with uncovered
market cannot be sustained at equilibrium. For example, when γ > γ, θ∗H > b (and p
∗
H < 0), then
firm H cannot be active at the duopoly equilibrium. Moreover, in the parametric region where b > b
and γ > γ, θ∗L < 0 then the market is covered. In particular, in this latter case of duopoly covered
at the limit, the pair of candidate equilibrium prices is:
pCL = γ (qH − qL) , (12)
pCH =
(b− γ) (qH − qL)
2
(13)
where additional superscript C indicates the covered market.30
The following lemmas identify the market configurations that emerge for each combination of b
and γ, the crucial parameters of our model. We include the mathematical proofs in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 specifies the conditions for the duopoly equilibrium to hold:
30 In the Appendix we provide further insights and additional calculations for this and following cases. See also
the corresponding Lemmas for further details on the precise parametric regions where such price candidates hold at
equilibrium.
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Lemma 1 Provided b > b, both firms are active in the market when γ ∈ [max{0, γ},max{γ, b}).
The duopoly is sustained by an interior equilibrium for γ ∈ [max{0, γ},min{γ, γ}), while it is
sustained by a corner equilibrium with market coverage for γ ∈ [γ, b). The latter possibility
only occurs when b ≥ b.
Proof. See Appendix.
It follows that, when b is sufficiently high and γ is not excessive, a duopoly emerges at the
equilibrium. When this happens, two additional results are worthy of attention. First, by comparing
equilibrium prices in the duopoly scenarios, we find that:
Remark 1 When the market is characterized by a duopoly, the equilibrium price of the green variant
can be higher than that of the brown variant. In particular, this always holds when the duopoly
is covered at the limit, and in γ ∈ (γ, min{γ, γ}) when the duopoly is uncovered, given that
p∗L > p
∗
H when γ >
b(2q2H − 3qHqL + q
2
L)− cqH
(qH − qL) (5qH − qL)
≡ γ.
Proof. See Appendix.
Second, by recalling Proposition 1, we find that:
Remark 2 For intermediate values of γ the duopoly equilibrium is characterized by horizontal
differentiation and both firms get a positive market share when selling at the same price. For
relatively high (low) values of γ, environmental (hedonic) vertical differentiation prevails.
Proof. See Appendix.
By combining the results of Lemma 1 and Remarks 1-2, one realizes how the duopoly equilibrium is
crucially affected by social preferences. For relatively low levels of γ, hedonic vertical differentiation
characterizes the market interaction between the brown and the green producer. Consumers are
mainly interested in the intrinsic quality of the product rather than its environmental impact, and
the brown firm can charge a higher price than its green rival. For intermediate values of γ, horizontal
differentiation prevails and both producers obtain a positive market share even when charging the
same price. Within this parametric region, a price switch occurs for γ > γ, meaning that the
green producer obtains a price premium since environmental savvy consumers highly value the green
dimension of quality. Such a price gain is more pronounced when γ further increases. Moreover,
as we enter the interval region γ > γH , environmental vertical differentiation properly describes
market competition, as we know from Proposition 1. In the last region compatible with a duopoly
equilibrium, i.e. γ ∈ [γ, b), not only the green producer enjoys the price premium, but it also covers
the market at the limit.
In order to complete the characterization of the market equilibria, we next consider the possibility
for either firm to monopolize the market. In case of green monopoly, the candidate equilibrium price
13
for the covered market coincides with pCL defined in (12), while for the uncovered market it is:
pML =
c+ γ (qH − qL) + bqL
2
, (14)
where M indicates the monopoly case. As for the brown monopoly, the candidate equilibrium price
is
pMH =
bqH − γ(qH − qL)
2
. (15)
Our results are gathered in Lemmas 2 and 3.
Lemma 2 The green firm monopolizes the market for γ > max{γM , γ, b}, where γM ≡
c− bqL
qH − qL
.
The green monopoly market is covered for γ ≥ γM ≡
c+ bqL
qH − qL
, otherwise it remains uncovered.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 3 The brown firm monopolizes the market in the range of parameters such that b ∈ [0, b0)
and γ < min{γ, γM}, where γM ≡
bqH
(qH − qL)
.
Proof. See Appendix.
Finally, we can identify a relatively small interval region where neither the brown nor the green
producer is active on the market. In particular,
Lemma 4 There is no active firm at the market equilibrium when b ∈ [0, b) and γ ∈ (γM , γM).
Proof. See Appendix.
While the results of Lemma 4 complete our equilibrium analysis, we focus on intervals where at
least one firm is active. The following Proposition summarizes the main findings of Lemmata (1-3):
Proposition 2 Depending on the interplay between b and γ, we can characterize two relevant para-
metric regions:
(i) For relatively low values of b (b ∈ (b,b)), both firms are active at the interior equilibrium when γ
takes intermediate values, while the market is monopolized by the green (resp. brown) producer
for γ sufficiently high (resp. low). At the green monopoly equilibrium, the green producer finds
it profitable to cover the whole market when γ is extremely relevant.
(ii) When b is relatively high (b ≥ b), the brown producer never monopolizes the market. Further,
under duopoly, the green firm can optimally cover the market. This happens when γ is relatively
high. Finally, it becomes increasingly difficult for the green firm to monopolize the market.
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Proof. It directly follows from combining the proofs of Lemmata 1-3.
Figure 1 represents all the different market configurations which emerge at equilibrium, together
with the price switch discussed in Remark 1.31 As we restricted our attention to the case qH/qL ∈
[1, 2), Figure 1 is plotted by fixing qH = 1.5 and qL = 1, together with c = 1. This is without loss of
generality.32 Given that we focused only on market prices in the previous analysis, Table 1 provides
the corresponding market shares and profits.
Figure 1: qH/qL ∈ (1, 2)
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Table 1
Market share Profits
UD
x∗L =
qH [(qH−qL)(2γqH+bqL)−c(2qH−qL)]
bqL(4qH−qL)(qH−qL)
,
x∗H =
cqH+(qH−qL)[2bqH−γ(3qH−qL)]
b(4qH−qL)(qH−qL)
π∗L =
qH [(qH−qL)(2γqH+bqL)−c(2qH−qL)]
2
bqL(qH−qL)(4qH−qL)2
,
π∗H =
{cqH+(qH−qL)[2bqH−γ(3qH−qL)]}
2
b(qH−qL)(4qH−qL)2
.
CD
xCL =
(b+γ)
2b ,
xCH =
(b−γ)
2b .
πCL =
(b+γ)[γ(qH−qL)−c]
2b ,
πCH =
(b−γ)2(qH−qL)
4b .
UGM xML =
γ(qH−qL)−c+bqL
2bqL
. πML =
[c−bqL−γ(qH−qL)]
2
4bqL
.
CGM xCML = 1 π
CM
L = γ(qH − qL)− c
BM xMH =
bqH−γ(qH−qL)
2bqH
πMH =
[bqH−γ(qH−qL)]
2
4bqH
UD=Uncovered duopoly, CD=Covered duopoly, UGM=Uncovered green monopoly, CGM=Covered green
monopoly, BM=Brown monopoly
It is interesting to consider how profits in the different market configurations change with b,
31The issue of vertical vs. horizontal differentiation reported in Remark 2, while being useful in interpreting our
results, does not add much in terms of graphical representation.
32As we already mentioned, we provide the analytical solutions of the case qH/qL ≥ 2 in the Appendix.
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namely the highest willingness to pay for the hedonic quality.33 To this aim, first notice that the
equilibrium prices always increase in b. This result is general (since it holds whatever the equilibrium
configuration) and intuitive: as b increases, consumers’ willingness to pay for quality increases, and
in turn equilibrium prices increase. Nonetheless, equilibrium profits are not always increasing in b.
In particular, while the equilibrium profits of the brown firm increase in b for any value of γ, those
of the green firm may either increase or decrease, depending on the equilibrium configuration. This
crucially depends on the impact of b on the equilibrium market share of the green firm. Figure 2
highlights this finding.
Figure 2: ∂πL/∂b in qH/qL ∈ (1, 2)
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At the monopoly equilibria, not only the equilibrium price but also the corresponding market
share increases with the consumers’ willingness to pay. This explains why the green firm’s profits
are increasing in b. On the contrary, at the duopoly equilibrium, they increase with b only when γ is
sufficiently low, namely ∂πL/∂b > 0 when γ < γˇ in Figure 2.34 In order to get an intuition for this
result, it is useful to go through the equilibrium demands in the case of duopoly. For low values of
γ, when the market is uncovered, the model behaves as in a traditional setting of (hedonic) vertical
differentiation (that is the case γ → 0). In particular, an increase of b implies that both equilibrium
prices increase, with pH increasing more than pL. This in turn involves that equilibrium demand
for the brown high quality firm decreases, whereas the one for the green low quality firm increases.
Indeed, the green firm gains more consumers "at the right-end" (at the expenses of the brown firm)
than those which loses "at the left-end" of the market (as its equilibrium price increases). Hence, both
33We include in the Appendix (Profits at the duopoly equilibrium: the role of b and γ) the analytical computations
of the effect of b and γ on equilibrium market shares and profits.
34The threshold value γˇ can be found in the Appendix.
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the equilibrium price and the corresponding market share increase in b, thus explaining the resulting
increase in profits. As for the brown firm, the price surge overcomes the demand contraction so that
its profits increase as well. At the other extreme, when γ is sufficiently high to outweigh the hedonic
attribute, thus inverting the quality ranking, vertical environmental differentiation prevails. This is
the reason why ∂x∗L/∂b < 0 and ∂x
∗
H/∂b > 0; the equilibrium demand of the green good (which is
considered now of high quality) decreases, whereas the demand of the brown good (which is perceived
of low quality) increases. When γ is very high (γ > γˇ in Figure 2), the demand reduction suffered
by the green producer prevails over the price increase, thus explaining why ∂π∗L/∂b < 0. This result
applies a fortiori in the case of the corner duopoly, where the equilibrium market share of the green
firm decreases with b, whereas its equilibrium price is independent of b.
Corollary 1 Consider the green firm. When it enjoys a monopoly position at the equilibrium, its
profits increase with b. At the duopoly equilibria, its profits increase with b whenever the social
component of consumption γ is not extremely significant. On the contrary, they decrease in b
when γ is sufficiently high, as the demand reduction prevails over the price increase.
As far as the effect of the social component of consumption is concerned, whatever the equilibrium
configuration, an increment of γ always benefits the green firm while damaging the brown one given
b. Notice that, although the impact of γ on the equilibrium profits is intuitive, it crucially contributes
to determine the market configuration prevailing at equilibrium, given b. Consider sufficiently high
values of b (b > b) and γ (γ > γ) and focus on Lemmas 1 and 2, combined with Remarks 1 and
2. Figure 1 shows that the duopoly holds at equilibrium when γ ∈ [max{0, γ},max{γ, b}), as from
Lemma 1. Indeed, it shows the interval region where the price switch takes place (γ > γ, as from
Remark 1) and the green firm can quote a price higher than the brown rival, its variant being
perceived higher than the other along the quality ladder. In this case, the environmental dimension
of quality is more valuable than the hedonic counterpart, and we can even have a region characterized
by environmental vertical differentiation (Remark 2).
Another interesting feature of our model is that both the price of the green variant and the
corresponding market share increase with γ, whatever the equilibrium market configuration.35 Ac-
cordingly, there is no trade-off between the price switch and the market share enjoyed by the green
firm. In fact, for sufficiently high values of γ, the brown firm stays inactive. This is represented in
Figure 1 in the parametric region γ > max{γM , γ, b}, where the green firm monopolizes the market,
as we know from Lemma 2. Finally, for extremely high values of γ (γ ≥ γM), the market is covered
and the green firm sells its variant to the whole set of consumers.
35 Indeed, the positive effect of γ on the equilibrium price and market share is observed under both duopoly and
monopoly.
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Notice that these results are always mitigated by parameter b. This is evident in Figure 1, where,
the higher the b, the higher the γ − value required for the above results to emerge. Therefore, we
can state:
Corollary 2 Ceteris paribus, both the price switch and the green monopolization results are more
likely to occur for relatively low values of b.
Proof. It is relatively easy to show that all the relevant threshold values of γ are increasing in b.
This, combined with the proofs of Lemmata 1-3, completes the demonstration.
Finally, the above results can be applied to each specification of the quality ratio qH/qL. The
equilibrium analysis reported in this section assumes a quality gap such that qH/qL ∈ (1, 2). In the
Appendix we show that the same qualitative results hold for qH/qL ≥ 2; although the interval region
defined by the relevant threshold values of γ change in dimension, at equilibrium we get the same
market configurations as in Proposition 2. Figure 3 represents this case. The unique difference with
respect to Figure 1 is that qH = 2.8.
Figure 3: qH/qL ≥ 2
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A comparison between Figure 1 and Figure 3 enables us to evaluate the consequences of increasing
the quality gap between the two variants. Two forces are pushing towards opposite directions given
that consumers value the environmental performance of the product and not only its intrinsic quality.
On the one hand, as qH/qL increases, consumers appreciate the intrinsic quality difference more,
thus rewarding the high quality-brown producer. On the other hand, the higher hedonic quality gap,
which corresponds to a higher environmental quality gap, raises the social component of consumption
γ(qH − qL), thus contributing to favor the low quality-green producer. It is again the interaction
between γ and b that determines which of these two forces dominates. When γ is relatively high,
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notice in Figure 3 that the area where the market is covered, both for the green monopoly and for
the duopoly, expands. Ceteris paribus, an increase in the quality gap is reflected here in a higher
effectiveness of relative preferences. On the contrary, for relatively low levels of γ, the intrinsic quality
dominates the environmental effects, and an increase in qH/qL benefits the brown producer. One can
notice, for example, that the area where the price switch does not occur is larger in Figure 3.36
5 Some environmental policy implications
We evaluate the effect on the environmental damage of imposing a minimum quality standard (MQS)
on pollution emissions. We assume that the MQS is binding only for the brown firm, which is induced
to improve its environmental quality (i.e. to reduce qH), while the green firm does not change its
quality variant.37 We consider the case in which the brown firm still pollutes more than the green
rival (namely eH > eL). Moreover, the abatement effort penalizes the intrinsic quality of a good so
that a trade-off between environmental quality and hedonic quality immediately emerges.38 The total
environmental damage deriving from global emissions (D) is defined as the sum of the environmental
damage coming from both the green and the brown firm, respectively indicated as DL = qLxL and
DH = qHxH .39 Remember that we previously assumed that hedonic qualities reflect the per-unit
emissions of the goods, i.e. qL = eL and qH = eH . Formally, we consider how DL and DH change
with qH for any given qL.
The main findings can be explained by tracking down a technique effect and a stealing effect which
appears when the environmental quality gap diminishes. The former indicates the direct reduction
in the total damage deriving from the abatement effort which reduces pollution emissions per unit of
output. The latter captures the indirect increase in total damage due to the expansion of the brown
firm’s market share at the expense of the green rival. In our model, the stealing effect is moved by
two drivers: a price competition driver and a social component driver. Improving the environmental
quality of the brown good reduces the quality gap between variants, thereby reinforcing the price
competition driver. As a result, the brown firm expands its market share and steals consumers from
the rival. An immediate consequence is a reduction of the damage coming from the green firm, DL.
As for DH , the overall effect is ambiguous. This stealing effect is magnified by the social driver γ
while weakened by the WTP for the hedonic quality b. The higher is γ, and/or the lower is b, the
larger the market share obtained by the brown producer due to the quality gap reduction. Thus, for
a relatively high γ, the social component of consumption reinforces price competition so that DH
increases. Rather, as long as γ is low relative to b, the stealing effect is not very strong due to the
36An increase in qH/qL implies an upward shift of γ, as it can be easily demonstrated.
37We briefly discuss the possibility for this MQS to be binding for both firms at the end of this section.
38This holds at least in the short-run, and we confine our analysis to this case.
39The environmental damage is usually taken to be quadratic in the level of emissions. This alternative assumption
would not change our qualitative results. Indeed, ∂D2/∂qH = 2D (∂D/∂qH), so that given the positiveness of D, the
sign of ∂D2/∂qH coincides with the sign of ∂D/∂qH . See also Lambertini (2013) for this assumption of linear damage.
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weakness of the social driver and the technique effect can prevail with a corresponding reduction in
DH .
The intensities of these contrasting forces depend on the market configuration that emerges at
equilibrium. Indeed, in case of uncovered duopoly, the environmental damage is:
DD = D
L
D +D
H
D = qH
b (2qH + qL) + γ (qL − qH)− c
(4qH − qL)
.
A reduction of qH raises the equilibrium market share of the brown firm while decreasing that of the
green producer when γ is sufficiently high, as the consumption coming from the social motivation
decreases when the environmental quality gap diminishes.40 In this case, the brown firm expands
its market share by stealing consumers from the rival. Thus, the damage coming from the output
produced by the green firm (DLD) decreases. As for the effect on the damage deriving from the
production of the brown firm, this is ambiguous. On the one hand, per unit emissions decrease
(technique effect), but on the other hand, the market share of the brown firm increases (stealing
effect). The first effect is independent of γ and b. The second effect increases instead with γ and
decreases with b. As a result, as long as γ is low relative to b, the direct effect of reducing qH
predominates, so that DHD diminishes, and therefore total damage decreases. In contrast, for higher
values of γ, it is the indirect effect to prevail so that DHD increases. For very high values of γ, the
increase in DHD is stronger than the reduction in D
L
D, and total damage augments. All in all, the
overall effect of reducing qH is such that the total damage increases for relatively high values of γ
whereas it decreases in the opposite case.
Under covered duopoly, the environmental damage is:
DC = D
L
C +D
H
C =
1
b
qL
2
(b+ γ) +
qH
2
(b− γ)

. (16)
Both components of damage (DLC and D
H
C ) decrease linearly with the environmental qualities qH and
qL. Interestingly, the stealing effect does not play any role because the market share of each firm is
independent of the rival’s environmental quality. Therefore, DiC , the damage coming from producer
i, increases with qi, while being independent of qj , with i, j = H,L and i = j. We thus conclude
that, in this equilibrium market configuration, imposing a MQS would unambiguously reduce total
damage.
Finally, consider the case in which the market is monopolized by the green firm. In the uncovered
monopoly, the environmental damage writes as
DM = qL
bqL − c+ γ (qH − qL)
2qL
=
bqL − c+ γ (qH − qL)
2b
. (17)
Improving the environmental quality of the brown good unambiguously reduces the environmental
damage. At first sight, this finding can be counterintuitive, given that the brown firm is inactive.
40We include in the Appendix (see Proof of Proposition 3) the precise expressions of the threshold values of γ that
are mentioned in this section.
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However, it may undertake an abatement effort with the aim of re-entering the market. Notice that
the market share of the green firm is affected by the quality produced by the brown producer; the
more pollutant the brown good, the larger the market share of the green firm, and thus the higher
the corresponding damage. In this circumstance, the abatement effort undertaken by the brown firm
indirectly reduces the damage. The same finding does not hold in the covered monopoly, in which
the damage coincides with the per-unit emissions of the green good, qL. The brown firm no longer
plays a role in determining the damage since the market share of the green producer is no longer
affected by the environmental quality of the potential rival.41
We can now summarize our results:
Proposition 3 Improving the environmental quality of the brown firm reduces the total damage: (i)
unambiguously in case of covered duopoly and uncovered green monopoly; (ii) whenever the reduction
in damage due to the technique effect is stronger than the corresponding increase brought on by the
stealing effect, in case of uncovered duopoly.
Proof. See the Appendix.
It is worth noting that, in contrast with the environmental damage, the duopoly profits differently
react to a reduction in qH . Under uncovered duopoly the profits of the brown firm increase when
qH diminishes for γ sufficiently high and vice versa. However, when γ is large enough to induce
market coverage, its profits decrease when qH reduces. Therefore, for a given qL, the brown firm
benefits from abating per-unit emissions as long as the social component of consumption is large and
the market is uncovered. On the contrary, for relatively low values of γ, the brown firm would be
tempted to increase its hedonic quality qH in absence of the policy instrument. Thus, imposing a
MQS becomes more relevant as γ decreases.
In the case of uncovered green monopoly, improving the environmental quality of the brown
good reduces the profits of the green firm. This is not surprising. The brown producer affects
the equilibrium profits of the rival even in the case when it is not active in the market via the
price competition driver and the social component driver. The trade-off between hedonic and social
component of quality is such that, when the brown producer increases the hedonic quality of its
variant, it reduces the quality gap. Reducing this gap immediately decreases the equilibrium profits
of firm L as it typically observed in a vertically differentiated market. This effect is then magnified
or weakened by the social component of consumption.42
Interestingly, one can conclude that the incentive for firms to support or rather oppose a MQS
change with the market structure. For example, there exists circumstances where a MQS is supported
by the brown producer but opposed by the green firm. This happens in case of green monopoly where
41 In a way, this result is reminiscent of the natural monopoly property while the one observed in the case of uncovered
monopoly resembles the potential competition in the contestable markets.
42Notice that this finding can be extended to the case of covered green monopoly.
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the effort to curb emissions undertaken by the brown firm reduces the equilibrium profit of the green
firm. This may possibly enable the brown competitor to re-enter the market. Under uncovered
duopoly, the brown firm supports the introduction of a MQS whenever the social component of
consumption is sufficiently strong, otherwise its equilibrium profits decrease when it improves the
environmental quality of its variant at the expense of the hedonic dimension. Still, at this market
configuration, the green firm does not benefit from an increase of the environmental quality of the
brown variant. Since its equilibrium profits decrease with the greenness of the competing good, it
firm opposes the introduction of a MQS. Finally, both firms are unambiguously damaged by the
introduction of a MQS under covered duopoly, since their equilibrium profits decrease with the
environmental quality of the brown variant. In this circumstance, no firm finds it profitable to
support this policy measure. Table 2 summarizes these results.
Table 2: Impact of a MQS (reduction of qH for given qL)
Environmental damage Profits
UD DD either ↓ or ↑
π∗L ↓
π∗H either ↓ or ↑
CD DC ↓
πCL ↓
πCH ↓
UGM DM ↓ πML ↓
UD=Uncovered duopoly, CD=Covered duopoly, UGM=Uncovered green monopoly
Finally, although it is reasonable to assume that by definition the green firm satisfies the MQS on
emissions, it may well happen that the MQS imposed by the policy maker is binding for both firms.
Looking at (16), it is relatively easy to assess the effect on total damage from a joint abatement
effort in case of covered duopoly. Indeed, in this scenario, as there is no stealing effect, improving
the environmental qualities would clearly reduce the damage. As for the cases of uncovered duopoly
and monopoly, we can capture the net effect of a joint abatement effort through a complementary
assessment of a unilateral investment of the green firm. To this aim, we consider how D changes
with qL for a given qH . Under uncovered duopoly, similarly to the above analysis, increasing the
environmental quality of the green firm has two effects: a direct technique effect that calls for a
reduction of total damage, and an indirect effect due to the fact that reducing qL amplifies the
hedonic quality gap thereby softening the price competition in the market. In this case, the market
share of the brown firm decreases thereby reducing the corresponding damage, whereas the market
share of the green firm can decrease. Namely, the green firm expands its market if γ is very significant.
Nevertheless, from algebraic computations, we find that the net effect on total damage is clear-cut:
it always decreases. Indeed, the reduction in damage deriving from the brown firm outweighs the
increase in the damage coming from the green producer. We can conclude that, if both firms invest
in abatement, the net effect on total damage depends on the intensity of their effort. If the green
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producer invests more (resp. less) than the rival, the environmental quality gap increases (resp.
decreases). In this circumstance, the mechanism arising when only the green (resp. brown) firm
invests in abatement applies. Finally, under uncovered monopoly, we find that an abatement effort
by the green firm increases total damage as its market share enlarges and this output expansion effect
prevails over the technique effect. If both firms pursue the investment, the net effect on total damage
depends on the intensity of the effort of each player, as described in the case on uncovered duopoly.
6 A discussion of our main assumptions
Our model has been developed under two key assumptions. First, we assume the existence of relative
preferences for environmental quality. Still, in several circumstances consumers also care about the
absolute level of emissions coming from a product rather then focusing on the absolute environmental
quality of a product. Moreover, our relative preferences are linked to two vertical attributes (hedonic
vs environmental quality), whereas one may argue that consumers often develop brand loyalty, so
that a true horizontal attribute could play a role.
The second key assumption regards production costs. We assume that production costs are nil for
the production of the brown good but positive and variable in quantity for the green good. Therefore,
in a very stylized way, the production costs depend on the environmental quality. However, different
cost structures may be considered depending on the type of abatement effort enacted by firms.
We next discuss with some formal details how our assumptions could be relaxed based on the
above considerations.
6.1 Relative and absolute preferences for environmental quality
Consumers may care about absolute levels of emissions for several reasons. For instance, they may
benefit from different forms of rewards when buying environmentally friendly goods. In the auto-
motive sectors, under the European Green Cars Initiative funded by the European Commission, the
reduction of car registration taxes on low CO2 cars aimed to stimulate green car purchases through
monetary benefit.43 Accordingly, the omission of absolute preferences for environmental quality is
questionable and one may wonder how the main findings of our model would change when introducing
this further ingredient in the analysis.
A natural entry point for nesting absolute preferences in our framework is to write the indirect
utility function of consumer type θ as follows:
U (θ) =


θqH − pH − γ (qH − qL)− µeH , if she buys the high quality but brown good,
θqL − pL + γ (qH − qL)− µeL, if she buys the low quality but green good,
0, if she refrains from buying.
(18)
43Along the same rationale, when purchasing electric vehicles, drivers are provided by local governments with pref-
erential parking permits in urban areas (e.g., City of Amsterdam) or authorization to drive in bus and taxi lanes.
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The parameter µ ∈ (0, b) describes the consumers’ sensitivity to the absolute level of emissions coming
from the goods they purchase. Recalling that ei = φqi and φ = 1, the utility from buying good i can
be written as qi (θ − µ)−γ (qi − qj)−pi with i, j = {L,G} and j = i. Note that this new formulation
can also capture, with minor changes, the idea that consumers are only concerned with the absolute
level of emissions. For this to be evident, it suffices to drop from the above utility function the
relative preferences.44
It is easy to see that the introduction of the parameter µ induces a reduction of consumers’
willingness to pay for the good i, for any consumer type θ. In particular, the consumer that is
indifferent between buying the low quality good and not buying at all now writes:
θ
′
L = µ+
pL − γ(qH − qL)
qL
.
with θ
′
L > 0 ⇐⇒ pL > γ(qH − qL)− µqL; the consumer that is indifferent between buying the low
quality good and the high quality good becomes:
θ
′
H = µ+ 2γ +
pH − pL
qH − qL
.
Ceteris paribus, θ
′
i − θi = µ > 0 for i = H,L. Thus, for any price pair (pH , pL), it emerges a
rightward shift equal to µ of the indifferent types of consumers with respect to the baseline model.45
Although this shift does not change our qualitative findings, it determines several interesting impli-
cations. First, from the equilibrium analysis carried out in the baseline model, we know that the
brown firm is indifferent between producing and not producing when θ∗H = b at γ = γ¯ (see proof
of Lemma 2 in Appendix). Given that now θ∗
′
H = θ
∗
H + µ, it immediately follows that, at γ = γ¯,
the brown firm is no longer active in the market since θ∗
′
H(γ¯) > b. Therefore, in this new setting,
the brown producer is indifferent between producing or not at γ = γ¯′ < γ¯, namely the market can
be monopolized by the green firm for a lower value of γ. Along the same rationale, we can observe
that, differently from the baseline model where θ∗L(γˆ) = 0, under absolute preferences the market is
uncovered at γ = γˆ since θ∗
′
L (γˆ) > 0 while it is covered at some γˆ
′ > γˆ. Finally, it is immediate to
44Formally, the utility of a consumer θ when purchasing the variant i writes as U(θ) = (θ− µ)qi − pi, with i = H,L.
Then, the analysis can be immediately reconciled with a traditional approach of vertical differentiation where the
willingness to pay of a consumer χ, with χ = θ − µ depends both on the willingness to pay for the hedonic quality θ
and the one for the environmental quality µ. The main findings of this model can be easily derived from an uncovered
duopoly market with vertical product differentiation.
45 It is worth noting that the utility function (18) resembles the one adopted in the literature on two-dimensional
vertical differentiation (see in particular Vandenbosch and Weinberg, 1995): when removing the relative preferences,
the utility in our model depends on the absolute vertical attributes of the good. However, we do not share the main
scope of these models centering around the effects of the "demand force" and "strategic force" on the "positioning of
firms" and optimal differentiation between pair of attributes (see Lauga and Ofek, 2011).
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see that the demand functions faced by firms H and L translate respectively as follows:
x′H =
1
b

b− θ
′
H

=
1
b

b−

µ+ 2γ +
pH − pL
qH − qL

x′L =
1
b
	
θ′H −max{θ
′
L, 0}


=


1
b

pHqL − qHpL
qL (qH − qL)
+
γ (qH + qL)
qL

if γ <
pL + µqL
(qH − qL)
,
1
b

µ+ 2γ +
pH − pL
qH − qL

if γ ≥
pL + µqL
(qH − qL)
.
Interestingly, plugging the equilibrium prices in the above functions, we observe that, with respect to
the baseline model, in case of uncovered market, the market share of both goods decreases, whereas
in the corner coverage equilibrium the market share of the brown firm decreases as much as the
market share of the green firm increases.46 Therefore, we can unambiguously state that the absolute
concern always reduces the environmental damage at equilibrium. In the case of uncovered market,
not only does the output of the brown firm decrease but also total output; in case of covered market
(that is, for a given total output) there is a redistribution of market shares from the more polluting
to the less polluting firm. In our paper, we can explain the above findings as follows. On one hand,
the disutility borne by consumers when they care about the absolute level of emissions reduces by
µ their willingness to pay for a good, whatever its hedonic quality. On the other hand, the absolute
concern µei affects firms in an asymmetric way, since eH > eL. As a result, the brown firm is afflicted
more than its green rival.
The above analysis proves that:
Proposition 4 When consumers display both relative and absolute preferences for environmental
quality, for any given b, compared with the baseline model: (i) the green firm monopolizes the market
at lower levels of γ, (ii) the market coverage by the green firm occurs at higher levels of γ, (iii) the
environmental damage always decreases.
6.2 Incorporating Horizontal Differentiation
In several cases, beyond considering the quality of goods, either hedonic or environmental, consumers
make decisions based on the brands they trust. As a consequence, ceteris paribus, they prefer to
purchase brands that are closer to their preference in the product space. Considering again the
automotive sector, quite often consumers base their purchasing decisions on their loyalty to a specific
brand. This can also be due to some monetary benefits which companies offer in the case of repeated
purchases.47 Then, one may think of fuel efficiency as the environmental vertical attribute, pure
performance as the hedonic vertical attribute, and brand as the horizontal attribute. We analyze
how the baseline model reacts to the introduction of a horizontal attribute in the utility function.
46For further details, see in the Appendix the section entitled Absolute preferences.
47Typically, BMW guarantees to its customers considerable discounts in case of repeated purchases.
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Assume that a share λ ∈ (0, 1) of consumers prefers the brand produced by the brown firm
H, while the remaining share (1 − λ) prefers that produced by the green firm L. When buying
their preferred brand, consumers enjoy an extra benefit captured by parameter α > 0, which is
independent from the relative environmental performance of the two products. Thus, the utility of
i-loyal consumers is given by
U i (θ) =


θqi − pi − γ (ei − ej) + α, if she buys the quality variant i,
θqj − pj + γ (ei − ej) , if she buys the quality variant j,
0, if she refrains from buying.
(19)
Additional superscript i = H,L denotes consumers that prefer brand i over j = L,H, with j = i.We
need to assume that α is not too strong, otherwise horizontal differentiation would outweigh vertical
differentiation and consumers would simply base their decision depending on the brand characteristic
that they prefer. In this extended version of our model the demand for each good is derived as the
sum of its demand coming from the share λ of H−loyal consumers and its demand coming from the
share (1− λ) of L-loyal consumers.48
Interestingly, this ingredient modifies the γ−intervals where the defining property of horizon-
tal/vertical differentiation holds along two dimensions. First, it can be proven that, whatever λ, the
parametric region where both firms have a positive demand at pH = pL enlarges. Second, depending
on λ, this enlargement can be coupled to either an expansion or a contraction of the parametric
intervals where the hedonic and the environmental vertical differentiation hold.
The former implication is quite intuitive as one could expect that introducing a true horizontal
attribute (in the form of brand loyalty) enlarges the parametric region where horizontal differentiation
prevails. In contrast, the latter implication is much less obvious and it deserves a closer analysis. In
particular, as long as λ is not very high, namely λ ≤ 1/2, the interval characterized by environmental
vertical differentiation increases, while that with hedonic vertical differentiation reduces. However, for
any λ > 1/2, the reverse is not true. Indeed, the interval with environmental vertical differentiation
decreases, while that with hedonic vertical differentiation does not enlarge. Thus, the benefit for
firm i deriving from the brand loyalty attitude α among the i−loyal consumers does not imply
a corresponding penalty for firm j. This can be explained by analyzing the demand functions.
Consider first the demand coming from the share of H − loyal consumers. Compared to the baseline
model, the consumer that is indifferent between buying the low quality good and the high quality
good, here labelled θHH , is such that θ
H
H < θH . On the contrary, the consumer that is indifferent
between buying the low quality good and not buying at all does not change, namely θHL = θL. It
immediately follows that, given pH and pL, the market share of H increases at expenses of firm L
48This modelling strategy is inspired by Espìnola-Arredondo and Zhao (2012). They extend the Hotelling duopoly
model by taking into account green consumerism distinguishing between green consumers and neutral consumers. With
the due important formal differences, we follow their reasoning to solve the model. In particular, in the Appendix, we
detail the assumption on α and we provide the modified total demand functions (see the section entitled Horizontal
differentiation). The complete solution of this extended model is available upon request.
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by ∆H = λ(θH − θHH) = λ

α
qH−qL

. In contrast, when considering L−loyal consumers, we observe
that θLH > θH . Accordingly, for any price pair (pH , pL), the market share of firm H among (1 − λ)
consumers decreases by ∆L = (1− λ)(θLH − θH) = (1− λ)

α
qH−qL

, while that of firm L expands by
the same amount. Hence, based only on the stealing effect, the presence of α benefits firm H at the
expense of the rival for any λ > 1/2, and vice versa for λ ≤ 1/2. Notice, however, that θLL < θ
H
L = θL,
where θLL indicates the consumer that is indifferent between buying the low quality good and not
buying at all among L − loyal buyers. Thus, when the market is uncovered, firm L receives an
additional benefit in terms of demand expansion, captured by∆′L = (1−λ)(θL−θ
L
L) = (1−λ)

α
qL

.49
Therefore, the total demand expansion for firm L is ∆TOTL = ∆L + ∆
′
L = (1 − λ)
αqH
(qH−qL)qL
with
∆TOTL > ∆H ⇔ λ <
qH
qH + qL
≡ λ1 ∈ (1/2, 1).
The effect of the introduction of a pure horizontal attribute on the parametric region where
vertical differentiation prevails is therefore asymmetric. Whenever the proportion of green-loyal
consumers is higher than that of brown-loyal consumers (λ ∈ (0, 1/2)), the parametric interval where
vertical hedonic differentiation occurs shrinks, while that of vertical environmental differentiation
enlarges. At the other extreme, when the share of brown-loyal consumers is much higher than that
of green-loyal consumers (namely, λ ∈ [λ1, 1)), we observe vertical hedonic differentiation in a wider
parametric interval, at the expense of vertical environmental differentiation. Otherwise, namely for
λ ∈ [1/2, λ1), both intervals of vertical differentiation shrink.50
6.3 Variable versus fixed costs
The literature on abatement effort usually distinguishes between two types of environmental inno-
vation: cleaner technologies and end-of-pipe technologies. "Cleaner production reduces resource use
and/or pollution at the source by using cleaner production methods, whereas end-of-pipe technolo-
gies curb pollution emissions by implementing add-on measures." (Frondel et al., 2007, p. 572).51
Typically, with cleaner technologies the cost is assumed to be variable, whereas with end-of-pipe
technologies it is assumed to be fixed (see, among others, Clemenz, 2010). Indeed, a cleaner tech-
nology entails a change in the production process so that per-unit of output emissions are lower
but marginal production costs are higher, the cleaner the technology is. In the case of end-of-pipe
technologies, some fraction of the pollutant is reduced without changing the production process.52
49 In the case of market coverage, ∆′L is nil and the stealing effect turns out to be the main driver of the market
configuration, given pH and pL.
50Additional information are provided in the Appendix, again in the section Horizontal differentiation.
51Typical examples of end-of-pipe technologies are catalytic convertors on automobile tailpipes that reduce pollutant
emissions after they have formed, whereas examples of cleaner production technologies are the use of environmentally
friendly materials (e.g. replacing organic solvents by water) and modification of the combustion chamber design
(process-integrated systems).
52"Incineration plants (waste disposal), waste water treatment plants (water protection), sound absorbers (noise
abatement), and exhaust-gas cleaning equipment (air quality control) are typical examples of end-of-pipe technologies.
In contrast, cleaner production technologies are seen as directly reducing environmentally harmful impacts during the
production process. The recirculation of materials, the use of environmentally friendly materials (e.g. replacing organic
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In spite of its simplicity, our assumption on costs enables us to capture the investment in cleaner
investment since the variable cost is borne only by the green firm. Interestingly, this cost structure
is consistent with the evidence that a market-based mechanism, such as a growing environmental
consciousness among consumers, is more likely to induce cleaner technology investment, since appli-
cation of end-of-pipe measures depends at least partially on regulatory pressure.53 Of course, given
that end-of-pipe measures are largely widespread, considering whether our findings still hold when
variable costs are replaced by fixed cost seems to be natural.
First, in line with a cleaner technology innovation, we extend the model to a more sophisticated
environmental quality-specific cost structure. In particular, we assume that production costs increase
with the environmental quality, namely ci(qi), with c′(qi) < 0 and 1/qi representing the environmental
quality of the variant i. This is a reasonable assumption given that, for instance, increasing fuel
efficiency may involve more adjustments on the functionality of the vehicle. Although this assumption
would not modify the qualitative results of our equilibrium analysis, it would imply quantitative
changes. In order to provide the intuition behind such a modification, one could assume that ci = c/qi.
This describes a marginal cost of production that increases with the environmental quality (which
in our model decreases with the hedonic quality). Introducing this cost structure implies that now
also the brown firm bears a positive production cost, although it is lower than that of the green
producer.54 A priori, with respect to the baseline model, this cost modification may favor either
firm in terms of the equilibrium results. The per unit cost difference between the two firms is now
given by c
qL
− c
qH
= c(qH−qL)
qHqL
. By comparing the above expression with the cost difference in the
baseline model, given by c, we find that c(qH−qL)
qHqL
> c ⇐⇒ qL <
qH
(qH+1)
. Assuming without loss of
generality that qH = 1, we can observe that if the quality gap is high enough (qL ∈ (0, 1/2)), then the
cost difference increases, thereby rendering the green firm worse off in comparison with the baseline
model.55 This is quite intuitive because the cost disadvantage for the less polluting firm is relatively
large. Therefore, on the one hand, this reduces the parametric regions where both a green monopoly
prevails and/or where the market is covered. On the other hand, it increases those where a duopoly
occurs, and where the brown firm monopolizes the market. As for the price switch, it appears now
in a larger parametric region, as the price charged by the green firm augments in response to the
higher cost difference. On the contrary, if the quality gap is low (qL ∈ [1/2, 1)), the green firm is
solvents by water), and the modification of the combustion chamber design (process-integrated systems) are examples
of cleaner production technologies (Frondel, p. 573)". Although cleaner production technologies are better "for both
environmental and economic reasons", they are often hampered by costly and time-consuming investment needed to
their development and implementation.
53See Frondel et al. (2007) among others.
54We could have considered a positive cost only for the green firm, increasing in quality, such as c/qL. The qualitative
results would have not changed, as one can easily demonstrate. Additional calculations are available upon request.
55The formal analysis remains unchanged, and the results of Proposition 2 can be easily replicated. However, in
terms of the equilibrium representations which appear in Figure 1, a higher cost difference has the same qualitative
effect as a higher marginal cost c. As it enters into the firms’ maximization process, an increases in c causes an upward
shift in all the relevant threshold values of γ except γ, which moves downward.
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better off because its cost disadvantage reduces. Mutatis mutandis, both the monopolization of the
green firm and the market coverage occur for comparatively lower level of γ, while the price switch
requires a higher level of the social component. Obviously, the parametric region where the brown
firm monopolizes the market tends to shrink.
Secondly, we can introduce a fixed cost for the green firm enacting end-of-pipe abatement effort.
More precisely, we can assume that, while the profit function of the brown firm remains the same,
that of the green firm now writes πL = pL · xL − F , so that both firms have variable production
costs equal to zero. It can be shown that the qualitative results of the baseline model (Proposition 2)
are robust to this cost modification, including the comparative statics of equilibrium variables with
respect to b and γ.56 The main difference with the baseline model is represented by the fact that
the fixed cost F does not enter the firms’ maximization process. This has two relevant consequences.
First, most of the relevant γ-threshold values shift downward, given that per unit cost difference is
now equal to zero. Ceteris paribus, this enlarges the parametric regions where market coverage and
green monopolization occur, as we know from the discussion above, provided the green firm is active.
Indeed, the only condition that depends on F is related to the presence of the green firm in the market;
when F is relatively high, the market is monopolized by the brown producer. Second, consider what
happens both in the baseline model and in the modified model when the respective costs increase. As
we already explained, when marginal cost c increases, the whole equilibrium configuration is affected
and both market coverage and green monopolization occur in a smaller parametric region. On the
contrary, for higher levels of F , although it still remains true that the green producer finds it harder
to survive, its chances to dominate the market, and even to cover it, are left unchanged.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have considered a situation in which a "clean" and a "dirty" firm compete in the
market by offering two products. They are differentiated along two dimensions, hedonic quality and
environmental quality, and characterized by a trade-off between these two vertical attributes. An
environmentally friendly good satisfies the consumer desire to stand out as a good citizen, while
leaving her unsatisfied due to poor performance.
Our findings can be summarized as follows. First of all, our model departs from a traditional
vertical differentiation setting, belonging rather to a hybrid category where in some circumstances the
defining property of vertical differentiation ceases to hold and consumers no longer uniformly prefer
a good over the alternative one. As a result, we find parametric regions where a price switch emerges,
with the low hedonic quality variant being sold at a higher price than the high hedonic quality one.
This occurs as a result of a quality switch, so that, at equal prices, all consumers prefer the green
good. In this case, the price switch is based on a vertical differentiation mechanism, given that the
56The complete solution of the model with the fixed cost of greenness is available upon request.
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green variant is considered also of high quality due to the dominance of the social component. The
price switch may also appear in a setting in which only some consumers prefer the green good to
the brown alternative, if they are sold at the same price. In such a case, however, the switch can
no longer be attributed to a vertical differentiation mechanism. Rather, the defining property of
competition is here associated to horizontal differentiation.
Secondly, when the social component of consumption is strong enough, then the market can
be monopolized by the green producer. It is worth noting that this result cannot be observed in a
vertically differentiated market where the lower bound of the market is nil. Typically, in this situation
there is always room in the market for two firms, as a natural monopoly setting requires the market
to be covered. Thirdly, differently again from the traditional vertical differentiation, where market
coverage never occurs when the lowest willingness to pay is nil, the green firm can find it profitable
to cover the market in the case of monopoly.
It is worth remarking that, if these two dimensions of product differentiation were not in contrast
with each other, then the equilibrium analysis would change. If the green product were also of high
hedonic quality, then we would never observe the price switch nor the market coverage scenario,
since the initial disadvantaged position due to the low (hedonic) quality would be amplified by
the social stigma associated to the production of the brown good. Interestingly, our model can
be reconciled with this setting where the trade-off is absent: for this to be evident, it suffices to
focus on the range of parameters such that one dimension of quality, either the hedonic or the
environmental one, unambiguously prevails over the other. As an example, consider the case in
which the environmental quality dominates the hedonic quality. Then, our approach can be intended
as a vertically differentiated model with the environmental quality being the driver of consumption.
Consistently with the framework without trade-off, we observe that at equilibrium either the market
is served by two producers with the price of the green variant being higher than the brown one, or
only the green firm is active.
Finally, we develop some policy considerations. In particular, we wonder whether the traditional
effects of a MQS described in a vertically differentiated duopoly still hold when consumption is also
driven by a social component. We consider the cases in which a MQS affects only the brown producer
or both producers and investigate the impact on total damage of this regulation in comparison with
standard duopoly models. From the above considerations, it derives that the social dimension of
consumption provides an incentive to specialize in green production. Indeed, the green firm can
benefit from a price premium or even monopolize the market for sufficiently high values of such
a component. An immediate consequence of this statement is that, contrary to what is somehow
argued, consumers may have a proactive role in reducing pollution. Nesting the conflict between
the social component of consumption and the individual rationality-based motive in the traditional
utility function enables us to show how this role can be carried out. Interestingly, we have shown
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that imposing a MQS may have ambiguous effects on the total environmental damage. Indeed, an
abatement effort carried out by the brown firm may result in an increase of the environmental damage
whenever the social component of consumption is very strong. This is due to the stealing effect that
prevails upon the technique effect, and it becomes even more evident when consumers also care about
the absolute level of environmental quality. In such a case, although the environmental damage is
less pronounced than in the baseline model, the negative effect of imposing a MQS may emerge for
lower levels of relative preferences. This consideration opens the door to further research questions.
For instance, one may investigate the optimal mix of environmental policy under the assumption of
relative and absolute preferences for environmental quality.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
First, observe that the interval [max{0, γ},max{γ, b}) is non-empty for b > b given that γ >
0 ⇐⇒ b < b0 with b0 > b, γ > γ ⇐⇒ b > b and γ > b ⇐⇒ b < b. Notice also that the interval
[γ, b) is non-empty only for b > b, given that γ < b ⇐⇒ b > b. Secondly, following the previous
discussion, equilibrium candidates (6) and (7) verify that p∗L > c, p
∗
H > 0 and 0 < θ
∗
L < θ
∗
H < b only
when γ ∈ [max{0, γ},min{γ, γ}), where:
θ∗L =
2cqH − (qH − qL) [2γqH − (b+ γ)qL]
(4qH − qL) qL
,
θ∗H =
(qH − qL) [(2b+ 3γ)qH − (b+ γ)qL]− cqH
(4qH − qL) (qH − qL)
.
Indeed, for γ ≥ γ (which is possible only when b ≥ b) θ∗L ≤ 0 and the market is covered. However, an
interior duopoly solution with covered market cannot be sustained at equilibrium, as it can be easily
verified. In such a case, therefore, a duopoly with the market covered at the limit becomes the equi-
librium candidate. This equilibrium configuration is characterized by constrained price competition.
As the market is covered at the limit, the indifferent consumer θL defined in (1) is set equal to zero,
and demand functions are xL = θH/b and xH = (b − θH)/b. Accordingly, the equilibrium price of
the green good is given by pCL > c (see 12). Inserting p
C
L into the best reply of the high quality firm
and solving, we obtain (13), and pCH is strictly positive iff γ < b. Hence, when γ ≥ γ, there is still
room for both producers and the market is covered at the limit only when γ < b.
Proof of Remark 1
At the interior duopoly equilibrium, we find that:
p∗L  p∗H ⇐⇒ γ 
b(2q2H − 3qHqL + q
2
L)− cqH
(qH − qL) (5qH − qL)
≡ γ.
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Moreover, it is straightforward to verify that γ ∈ (0,min{γ, γ}) when qH/qL ∈ (1, 2) . In such a case,
then, the price set by the green producer is higher than that set by the brown one when γ ∈ (γ,
min{γ, γ}). The opposite holds in γ ∈ (0, γ]. Consider the covered duopoly at the limit, which holds
when γ > γ and b > b. We obtain that:
pCH > p
C
L ⇐⇒ γ <
b
3
.
However, it is immediate to verify that:
γ − b
3
=
2 [3cqH − b (qH − qL) (qH − 2qL)]
3 (qH − qL) (2qH − qL)
> 0
given that we are limiting our attention to the case where qH/qL ∈ (1, 2). When the duopoly is
covered at the limit, we then obtain that pCH < p
C
L .
Proof of Remark 2
First of all, we insert p∗L in bD(pL) and impose γ = γ to and verify that:
γH > γL(p∗L|γ=γ) ⇐⇒ b ≥
4cqH
(qH + qL)(3qH + qL)
≡ b∗D.
Moreover, in such a case,
xL|p∗
H
=p∗
L
> 0 ⇐⇒ γ >
2cqH + b(qH − qL)qL
2q2H + 5qHqL − q
2
L
≡ γLID,
where ID stands for Internal Duopoly. It is immediate so show that b < b∗D < b0 and that γ
H > γLID
when the duopoly is uncovered. When the market is covered at the limit, xL|p∗
H
=p∗
L
> 0 ⇐⇒ γ > 0.
Obviously, vertical hedonic differentiation cannot prevail when γ ∈ [γ, b).
All in all, under the conditions sustaining a duopoly (both covered and uncovered), market
competition between the green and the brown producer can be described by either horizontal or
vertical differentiation. In particular, when γ ∈ [max{0, γ}, γLID), the duopoly market is characterized
by hedonic vertical differentiation, as the social component of consumption is very weak. For γ ∈
[γLID, γ
H) horizontal differentiation prevails as both firms would obtain a positive market share even
when charging the same price. It is also possible to demonstrate that γ ∈ [γLID, γH), thus revealing
that the price switch occurs when products are perceived as horizontally differentiated. Finally, in
γ ∈ [γH ,max{γ, b}), the duopoly is characterized by environmental vertical differentiation, given
that consumers attach a significantly value to the environmental dimension of quality.
Proof of Lemma 2
The proof aims at demonstrating that, when γ > max{γM , γ, b}, two conditions are simultane-
ously verified: (i) the brown firm is not active in the market, neither at the duopoly nor at the
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monopoly equilibrium; (ii) the equilibrium price charged by the green firm when it holds a monopoly
position is higher than its marginal cost. First, notice that:
max{γM , γ, b} =


γM if b ≤ b,
γ if b ∈ (b,b),
b if b ≥ b.
Let us start from the brown firm. At the internal duopoly equilibrium, p∗H ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ γ ≤ γ,
as we know from (9). When γ > γ, then p∗H < 0 and the brown firm would stop producing.
Consider now γ ∈ (γ, γ), which holds in b ∈ [0, b]. Following (8), there exists the possibility for the
brown producer to monopolize the market, given that p∗L < c. In such a case, its profit would be
πMH = pH {b− [pH/qH + γ (qH − qL) /qH ]}. We compute the equilibrium price (15) and find that:
pMH > 0 ⇐⇒ γ <
bqH
(qH − qL)
≡ γM .
However, γM < γ in b ∈ [0, b]. This implies that pMH < 0 in γ > γ. The brown monopoly is therefore
excluded from the market when γ ∈ (γ, γ). Finally, from the demonstration of Lemma 1, we know
that, when the market is a duopoly covered at the limit, pCH ≥ 0 when γ ≤ b. Therefore, we need to
impose γ > b to remove the possibility for the brown producer to be active. To sum up, parametric
restrictions ensuring that the brown firm is not active in the market boil down to γ > max{γ, b}.
As for the green producer, in absence of the brown rival, it would obtain monopoly profit πML =
(pL − c) [bqL − pL + γ (qH − qL)] /qL. The resulting equilibrium price is (14), and
pML ≥ c ⇐⇒ γ ≥
c− bqL
qH − qL
≡ γM .
Therefore, we have to introduce the additional condition γ ≥ γM .As we notice above,max{γM , γ, b} =
γM if b ∈ [0, b]. We also have to verify that 0 < θML < b. We can easily find that:
0 < θML ≡
c− γqH + (b+ γ)qL
2qL
⇐⇒ γ <
c+ bqL
qH − qL
≡ γM ,
θML ≤ b ⇐⇒ γ ≥
c− bqL
qH − qL
≡ γM .
This verifies that the market is characterized at equilibrium by green monopolization when γ >
max{γM , γ, b}. The market is uncovered if γ < γM , with γM ≥ max{γ
M , γ, b}, and covered when
γ ≥ γM . In the latter case, the equilibrium price is given by (12).
Proof of Lemma 3
Two conditions have to simultaneously hold when γ < min{γ, γM}. First, the green firm can not
be active in the market. As we know from (8), p∗L < c when γ < γ. This requires b ∈ [0, b0), as
we know from (10). Second, the price charged by the brown firm when it acts as a monopolist has
to be positive. From the demonstration of Lemma 2, pMH > 0 when γ < γ
M . This always holds in
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b ∈ (b, b0], where it is immediate to demonstrate that γ < γM . On the contrary, in b ∈ [0, b] we find
that γM < γ, and therefore we have to impose the additional condition that γ < γM for pMH > 0. To
sum up, when b ∈ [0, b0), only the brown firm remains active in the market when γ < min{γ, γM}.
Proof of Lemma 4
From (11), γ < γ when b ∈ [0, b], thus complicating our analysis. Consider first γ < γ (< γ).
Firm L cannot be active at the internal duopoly, given that, from (8), p∗L < 0 when γ < γ. The
brown monopoly, however, can be sustained at equilibrium only when pMH > 0 ⇐⇒ γ < γ
M , as we
found in the proof of Lemma 2. Given that γM < γ in b ∈ [0, b], it follows that no producer is
active in γ ∈ (γM , γ). Consider now γ ∈ [γ, γ). In this region, p∗L < c and p
∗
H < 0. In the proof of
Lemma 2, we demonstrated that a brown monopoly does not exist, as γ > γM and therefore pMH < 0.
Neither the green monopoly can hold at equilibrium, as pML ≥ c only when γ ≥ γ
M > γ. A similar
reasoning can be applied when γ ≥ γ, where p∗H < 0 and the green monopoly holds at equilibrium
for γ ≥ γM > γ. To sum up, no firm is active when γ ∈ (γM , γM).
Equilibrium analysis for qH/qL ≥ 2
From Section 3, we know that γ > γ ⇐⇒ b < b, γ < γ and γ > γ ⇐⇒ b > b. However, when
qH/qL ≥ 2 an additional interval region takes place, given that
γ > γ


always when qH/qL ∈ (1, 2)
⇐⇒ b < b ≡ 3cqH
(qH − 2qL) (qH − qL)
when qH/qL ≥ 2
.
The complete ranking is as follows:
1. b ∈ (0,b): γ < γ < γ, where γ does not play any role as the equilibrium changes when γ ≥ γ,
given that the brown producer cannot charge a positive price in the market (see Lemma 2).
2. b ≥ b when qH/qL ∈ (1, 2), and b ∈ [b,b) when qH/qL ≥ 2 : γ < γ < γ, where γ is not considered
as we identified a covered market when γ ≥ γ (see Lemma 1).
3. qH/qL ≥ 2 and b ≥ b, where γ < γ < γ, and here both γ and γ do not play a role as they refer
to an internal equilibrium which no longer holds when γ ≥ γ.
We focus on the region where qH/qL ≥ 2 and b ≥ b, as the remaining interval region has already
been analyzed in the main text. The relevant ranking is here γ < γ < γ. Two cases have to be
considered:
1. In γ < γ we have an uncovered duopoly without price switch, given that now γ < γ.
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2. When γ ≥ γ, we have a covered duopoly in γ ∈ [γ, b) and a covered green monopoly when
γ ≥ b. In this interval region, in fact, γM < b, as it can be demonstrated by combining
γM > b ⇐⇒ b <
c
qH − 2qL
≡ bM
with the fact that bM < b. Hence, an uncovered green monopoly cannot be obtained at
equilibrium. As for the covered duopoly, the price switch occurs in γ ∈ [b/3, b), as:
pCH > p
C
L ⇐⇒ γ < b/3, and b/3 > γ ⇐⇒ b ≥ b.
Hence, in γ ∈ [γ, b/3), we obtain a covered duopoly at the limit without price switch.
Profits at the duopoly equilibrium: the role of b and γ
When the duopoly is sustained by an interior equilibrium, prices are given by (6) and (7). It is
immediate to find that:
∂p∗L
∂b
> 0,
∂p∗H
∂b
> 0,
∂p∗L
∂γ
> 0,
∂p∗H
∂γ
< 0.
Notice that ∂p∗H/∂b > ∂p
∗
L/∂b, given that qH > qL. At the same time, p
∗
L increases in γ whereas
p∗H decreases in γ. Demand functions at equilibrium, whose precise value is reported in Table 1, are
denoted as x∗L and x
∗
H . We find that:
∂x∗H
∂b
> 0⇔ γ > γ1 =
cqH
3q2H − 4qHqL + q
2
L
,
∂x∗L
∂b
> 0⇔ γ < γ2 =
c(2qH − qL)
2qH (qH − qL)
,
∂x∗L
∂γ
> 0,
∂x∗H
∂γ
< 0.
Moreover, taking into account that an uncovered duopoly holds when γ ∈ [max{0, γ},min{γ, γ}) (see
Lemma 1), we obtain that:
γ1 ∈ [max{0, γ},min{γ, γ})⇔ b ≥ c(4qH − qL)qL(3qH − qL) > b,
γ2 ∈ [max{0, γ},min{γ, γ})⇔ b ≥ c(4qH − qL)4q2H > b.
Finally, turning to equilibrium profits π∗L and π
∗
H (see Table 1 for precise expressions):
∂π∗L
∂b
> 0⇔ γ < γˇ =
c(2qH − qL) + bqL (qH − qL)
2qH (qH − qL)
,
∂π∗H
∂b
> 0
∂π∗L
∂γ
> 0,
∂π∗H
∂γ
< 0.
Observe that:
γˇ ∈ [max{0, γ},min{γ, γ})⇔ b ≥ c(4qH − qL)
4q2H − 3qHqL + q
2
L
,
γˇ > γ2 > γ1.
We can summarize the above results by distinguishing between four parametric regions:
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• γ < γ1: the model behaves as in a traditional setting of (hedonic) vertical differentiation.
When b increases, both p∗H and p
∗
L go up, with the former increasing more than the latter. As a
consequence, x∗H decreases, whereas x
∗
L increases. Notwithstanding the fact that ∂x
∗
H/∂b < 0,
the profit of the brown firm increases in b (∂π∗H/∂b > 0), meaning that the price surge overcomes
the demand contraction. As for the green firm, ∂x∗L/∂b > 0 as it gains more consumers "at the
right-end" than those which loses "at the left-end" of the market (as p∗L increases).
• γ ∈ [γ1, γ2): the value of γ is intermediate and neither vertical (hedonic/environmental) dimen-
sion prevails so that horizontal differentiation takes place. For this reason, not only ∂x∗L/∂b > 0
but also ∂x∗H/∂b > 0. As a consequence, both ∂π
∗
H/∂b > 0 and ∂π
∗
L/∂b > 0.
• γ ∈ [γ2, γˇ): γ is sufficiently high to outweigh the hedonic attribute, therefore inverting the
quality ranking as vertical environmental differentiation prevails. This explains why ∂x∗L/∂b < 0
and ∂x∗H/∂b > 0. However, the overall effect is such that ∂π
∗
L/∂b > 0; when b increases, for
the green firm the price surge (∂p∗L/∂b > 0) dominates the demand contraction (∂x
∗
L/∂b < 0).
• γ ≥ γˇ: γ is very high. The forces at work are the same as in the previous interval, with the
relevant exception that now for the green firm the demand reduction prevails over the price
increase, thus explaining why ∂π∗L/∂b < 0.
Consider now the corner duopoly with market coverage. Equilibrium prices are given by (12)
and (13). Notice that pCL does not change in b (as, in this constrained equilibrium, it coincides with
the valuation of consumer type zero), while it obviously increases in γ. As for pCH , it increases in b
but decreases in γ, as expected. Demand functions xCL and x
C
H are reported in Table 1, as well as
equilibrium profits πCL and π
C
H . First, it is immediate to compute the following derivatives:
∂xCL
∂b
< 0,
∂xCH
∂b
> 0 and
∂xCL
∂γ
> 0,
∂xCH
∂γ
< 0.
As one can see, ∂xCL/∂b = −∂x
C
H/∂b and ∂x
C
L/∂γ = −∂x
C
H/∂γ. Then, according to the previous
discussion, we find that:
∂πCL
∂b
< 0,
∂πCH
∂b
> 0 and
∂πCL
∂γ
> 0,
∂πCH
∂γ
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 3
(i) The proof directly follows from observing the total damage defined in (16) for the case of
covered duopoly and that in (17) for the case of green uncovered monopoly.
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(ii) In the unconstrained duopoly equilibrium, calculations are more complex. In particular, the
environmental damage computed at the equilibrium is:
DD = D
L
D +D
H
D = qLx
∗
L + qHx
∗
H , where
DLD =
qH
	
cqL − 2cqH + bqHqL − 2γqHqL − bq
2
L + 2γq
2
H


b (qL − qH) (qL − 4qH)
,
DHD =
qH
	
2bqHqL − cqH − 4γqHqL − 2bq
2
H + 3γq
2
H + γq
2
L


b (qH − qL) (qL − 4qH)
.
We proceed by studying the sign of the partial derivatives of DLD and D
H
D w.r.t. qH . First of all,
notice that
∂DLD
∂qH
=
∂qL
∂qH
xL +
∂xL
∂qH
qL ∝
∂xL
∂qH
,
given that (∂qL/∂qH)xL = 0. In particular:
∂xL
∂qH
> 0 ⇐⇒ γ >
qL[bqL (qH − qL)
2 − c
	
6q2H − 4qHqL + q
2
L


]
4qH (2qH − qL) (qL − qH)
2 ≡ γ3,
where γ3 < min{γ, γ}. Then, we evaluate:
∂DHD
∂qH
=
∂qH
∂qH
xH +
∂xH
∂qH
qH = xH +
∂xH
∂qH
qH ,
where ∂xH/∂qH < 0 in the parametric region under consideration. It follows that the sign of
∂DHD/∂qH is ambiguous. Direct computations reveal that:
∂DHD
∂qH
> 0 ⇐⇒ γ <
qH

4b (2qH − qL) (qH − qL)
2 − c (5qH − 2qL) qL

	
12q2H + q
2
L − 6qHqL


(qH − qL)
2 ≡ γ4,
where γ4 ∈ (γ3, γ). Finally, considering total damage:
∂DD
∂qH
=
∂DLD
∂qH
+
∂DHD
∂qH
=
∂xL
∂qH
qL + xH +
∂xH
∂qH
qH .
The sign is again ambiguous. We find that:
∂DD
∂qH
> 0 ⇐⇒ γ <
4bqH(2qH − qL) + qL(c− bqL)
4q2H + q
2
L − 2qHqL
≡ γP ,
where additional subscript P indicates pollution, as such threshold value of γ is particularly relevant
in terms of the environmental damage. One can easily verify that γP > γ4 > γ3. Interestingly, notice
that γP > γ, and that γP < γ only when b < bP ≡ c 	q2H − qHqL + q2L
 / (4qH + qL) (qH − qL)2.
Moreover, bP > b only when qH/qL < 2. Hence, γP > γ when qH/qL ≥ 2, meaning that γP lies
outside the relevant parametric region. Summing up:
(a) when qH/qL < 2, ∂DD/∂qH > 0 for each value of γ when b ≥ bP , as we have that γ3 < γ4 <
γ < γP . In b ∈ (b, bP ), threshold value γP becomes relevant, as γ3 < γ4 < γP < γ; it follows that
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∂DD/∂qH > 0 when γ < γP , and ∂DD/∂qH < 0 when γ ∈ [γP , γ]. More precisely, for γ ∈ [γP , γ]:
∂DLD/∂qH > 0, ∂D
H
D/∂qH < 0, ∂DD/∂qH < 0.
(b) When qH/qL ≥ 2, ∂DD/∂qH > 0 for every value of b.
Absolute preferences
When the market is characterized by an uncovered duopoly, equilibrium prices are:
p∗′L =
2cqH + (qH − qL) [2γqH + (b− µ)qL]
4qH − qL
,
p∗′H =
cqH + (qH − qL) [2bqH − γ(3qH − qL)− 2qHµ]
4qH − qL
.
Plugging these prices into the respective demand functions, we obtain equilibrium market shares:
x∗′L =
qH [(qH − qL) (2γqH + bqL − µqL)− c (2qH − qL)]
bqL(4qH − qL) (qH − qL)
,
x∗′H =
cqH + (qH − qL) [2qH(b− µ)− γ (3qH − qL)]
b(4qH − qL) (qH − qL)
.
Similarly, when the duopoly market is covered, equilibrium prices and market shares can be easily
calculated:
pC′L = γ(qH − qL)− µqL, p
C′
H =
1
2
[(b− γ)(qH − qL)− qHµ] ;
xC′L =
(qH − qL) (b+ γ) + µqH
2b (qH − qL)
, xC′H =
(qH − qL) (b− γ)− µqH
2b (qH − qL)
.
Comparing market shares in both the uncovered and the covered case with the corresponding ones
in the baseline model (see Table 1), we obtain:
x∗′L − x
∗
L = −
qHµ
(4qH − qL) b
< 0, x∗′H − x
∗
H = −
2qHµ
(4qH − qL) b
< 0;
and
xC′L − x
C
L =
qHµ
2 (qH − qL) b
> 0, xC′H − x
C
H = −
qHµ
2b (qH − qL)
< 0.
This confirms that, with respect to the baseline model, both market shares are reduced when the
market is uncovered, while the green firm expands its market at the expense of the rival when the
market is covered.
Horizontal differentiation
The assumption that must hold throughout the analysis is the following:
Assumption 1
α < min

1
qL
(pHqL − pLqH),
2pLqL
qL + λ(qH + qL)

.
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As we know from the extension of Subsection 5.2, for the fraction λ of the population the
demand for the brown good H expands at the expense of the green rival L, due to the presence
of the horizontal component α. However, the value of α cannot be to high. Indeed:
θHH > θ
H
L ⇔ α <
1
qL
(pHqL − pLqH).
Therefore, Assumption 1 guarantees that vertical differentiation is preserved for the fraction α
of consumers who prefer brand H. It is also immediate to verify that, under such assumption,
it always holds that θLH > θ
L
L. In other words, the horizontal component α does not invert the
hedonic vertical attribute of the model when we consider the (1−λ) fraction of consumers who
prefer brand L. Finally, when computing total demand functions, we find that:
x′H =
(b− 2γ)(qH − qL)− (pH − pL)− α(1− 2λ)
b(qH − qL)
,
x′L =


γ(qH − qL)(qH + qL) + α[qH − λ(qH + qL)]− pLqH + pHqL
b(qH − qL)qL
if γ <
pL − α
qH − qL
,
γ(2 + λ)(qH − qL)
2 + qL(pH − pL + α)− λ[pL(qH − qL)− 2qL]
b(qH − qL)qL
if γ ∈ [
pL − α
qH − qL
,
pL
qH − qL
),
pH − pL + 2γ(qH − qL) + α(1− 2λ)
b(qH − qL)
if γ ≥
pL
qH − qL
.
Also in this setting the defining property of vertical differentiation can cease to hold. In particular,
x′H

pH=pL
=
(b− 2γ)(qH − qL)− α(1− 2λ)
b(qH − qL)
≥ 0⇔ γ ≤
b
2
−
α(1− 2λ)
2(qH − qL)
≡ γHH ,
x′L

pH=pL
=


γ(qH − qL)(qH + qL) + α[qH − λ(qH + qL)]− pL(qH − qL)
b(qH − qL)qL
if γ <
pL − α
qH − qL
,
γ
b
(2 + λ)

qH − qL
qL

+
qL(α− 2λ)− λpL(qH − qL)
b(qH − qL)qL
if γ ∈ [
pL − α
qH − qL
,
pL
qH − qL
),
2γ(qH − qL) + α(1− 2λ)
b(qH − qL)
if γ ≥
pL
qH − qL
.
Under Assumption 1, it is possible to verify that α <
2pLqL
qL + λ(qH + qL)
guarantees that:57
x′L

pH=pL
≥ 0⇔ γ ≥
pL(qH − qL) + α[λqL − (1− λ)qH ]
(qH − qL)(qH + qL)
≡ γLL <
pL − α
qH − qL
.
Notice that γHH > γ
L
L ⇔ b >
2pL−α
qH+qL
≡ b
′
D(pL). Hence, when b > b
′
D(pL), at equal prices, at least
one firm is active in the market for any value of γ. Indeed, for γ < γLL, (resp. γ > γ
H
H), x
′
H |pH=pL > 0
and x′L|pH=pL = 0 (resp. x
′
H |pH=pL = 0 and x
′
L|pH=pL > 0); for γ ∈ [γ
L
L, γ
H
H ], x
′
H |pH=pL > 0 and
x′L|pH=pL > 0 so that the defining property of horizontal differentiation occurs. In order to compare
the present setting with the baseline model, focusing on the case b > bD, it can be proven that:
γHH > γH ⇐⇒ λ >
1
2
,
γLL > γL ⇐⇒ λ > λ1.
57Additional calculations are available upon request, together with the complete derivation of total demand functions.
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Then, with respect to the baseline model, we can state the following.
(i) When λ ∈ (0, 1/2): γHH ≤ γH and γ
L
L ≤ γL. The parametric interval where vertical hedonic
differentiation occurs reduces, while that of vertical environmental differentiation enlarges, given
that: 	
γH − γ
H
H


−
	
γL − γ
L
L


=

−
1
2

(qH + qL)
−1 α < 0.
(ii) When λ ∈ [1/2, λ1): γLL ≤ γL and γ
H
H > γH . Both intervals of vertical differentiation reduce.
Therefore, the interval of horizontal differentiation enlarges.
(iii) When λ ∈ (λ1, 1): γLL > γL and γ
H
H > γH . With respect to the baseline model, vertical
hedonic differentiation is observed in a wider parametric interval, while the opposite holds for ver-
tical environmental differentiation. The interval of horizontal differentiation moves rightward and
increases.
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